I have a diagnosis of Moore’s Paradox on the level of mind, not speech. It points to an irrational state in which a subject has a certain mental state and believes that she doesn’t have this mental state. Under specific conditions, such a subject is (structurally) irrational.

Why do I believe that p? This is a question that any subject can ask herself, and I call it the “self-rationalization question”. I think that an understanding of the unique kind of first-personal inquiry that this question initiates is informative about beliefs and their rationality.

I think that validity is a thick concept. This is a proposal in the debate on the normativity of logic.

Much has been written about what is involved in the adoption of thick concepts in moral philosophy, and I think the same is true for validity. In future work, I plan to apply these ideas to the “adoption problem” in the philosophy of logic.

I provide a reading of the solipsism sections (§5.6s) of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein took solipsism very seriously–throughout his career–and I aim to explain why. There is much to be learned from what the solipsist gets right and where she goes wrong.

Together with Madeleine Levac, I provide a reading of Anscombe’s notorious view on the first person. We uncover a complex and interesting view of I-thoughts, which has not been appreciated given the singular focus on her no-reference claim.

I have thought about first-person methods (e.g. in Descartes’ Meditations) in contrast to third-person methods (e.g. in philosophical naturalism), Frege’s suggestion that philosophical progress is made by means of a conceptual notation for the expression of thoughts, and conceptual analysis and conceptual engineering.

Together with Juliette Kennedy, I am currently editing a collection on Penelope Maddy’s work.